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SOC 2 readiness and security posture

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Compliance posture at a glance

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Trust service criteria — what we have, what’s in flight

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Security (mandatory)

• Multi-tenant Row Level Security on Postgres. 21 tables enforced today, target 50; rolling out wave-by-wave with a runAsBypass discipline lint. See the RLS architecture below.
• JWT auth with refresh tokens; Cognito federation for browser SSO; SAML / OIDC for enterprise SSO.
• Three built-in roles (member, admin, owner); RBAC primitive shared across REST, gRPC, and MCP.
• HMAC-SHA256 + Redis nonce replay for every agent gRPC stream (see agent ingress).
• TLS 1.3 in transit for every customer-facing endpoint (REST, WS, gRPC).
• AES-256 encryption at rest (RDS, S3, EBS); per-tenant KMS-derived keys for sensitive credential storage.
• AWS STS AssumeRole + external ID for cross-account reads; 15-minute temp credentials, never persisted.
• Read-only IAM on customer accounts. No bedrock:Invoke, no s3:Put, no logs:Put anywhere.
• Customer-owned S3 buckets for raw Bedrock invocation logs. We never copy raw logs to our account.
• Redaction at ingestion — raw prompts and responses are hashed; only hashes enter ai_spend_events. See redaction at ingestion.
• Rate limiting at the gateway and per-tenant on the gRPC ingress.
• CloudTrail, GuardDuty, AWS Config enabled across the platform AWS organization.
• Dependabot, secret scanning, required PR reviews + status checks on every repo.

• Trust portal scaffolding at trust.tensorcost.com.
• Per-tenant gRPC token-bucket rate limit (ADR-0010 CC-4).
• mTLS upgrade path for the agent ingress (post-Envoy migration).
• AI-service RLS rollout (next wave: 17 tables across the ai.* schema).

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Availability

• RDS Multi-AZ with automated backups (35-day retention).
• Redis ElastiCache cluster mode with replicas.
• ALB cross-zone load balancing; NLB targets in three AZs.
• Per-region deployment in us-east-1 (default), with EU-region rollout planned.
• Public status page at status.tensorcost.com (embed coming).
• Documented incident response procedure with PagerDuty rotation.

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Confidentiality

• All tenant data scoped by tenant_id and enforced by RLS.
• Sensitive config values (webhook URLs, routing keys, cloud credentials) encrypted at the column level using a per-tenant KMS-derived key. Surfaced as masked values in API responses; full values only via decrypt-scoped endpoints.
• Customizable data retention (30–365 days for raw metrics; 90–730 days for recommendations; 7 years for audit).
• Tenant offboarding flow with 30-day soft-delete; hard delete preserves audit-trail rows. See tenant offboarding.
• NDA template signed by every employee and contractor with production access.

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Processing integrity

• Analysis audit log captures every anomaly-detection decision: baseline statistics used, current value, each method’s score, composite confidence, classification.
• Inference feedback records every recommendation outcome (accepted / rejected / modified) with reason + post-action measurements; feeds back into ML training.
• Action queue tracks every enforcement action through pending → approved → executing → completed/failed with full audit trail.
• Event persistence via the event store (ADR-0011) — cross-instance durable event ledger.
• Daily ingest reconciliation — agent-emitted vs backend-received counts, with a delta alert.

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Privacy

• Privacy policy and DPA template on request.
• Personal data collected: email, name, IP / user-agent on auth, timezone preference.
• Subprocessor list available on request and republished annually.
• Cookie policy on the marketing site.
• DSAR process documented; DSARs handled within 30 days.

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Multi-tenant RLS

-- Pattern applied across 21 tables today, target 50
ALTER TABLE cost.savings_ledger ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation
  ON cost.savings_ledger
  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::uuid);

• gRPC handlers (after the agent’s tenantId is verified by HMAC).
• Cron-driven sweeps (anomaly detection, recommenders).
• Cross-service joins.

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Agent ingress

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Redaction at ingestion

• Bedrock invocation logs are read read-only from customer-owned S3 buckets (or CloudWatch Logs).
• The ingestion parser computes prompt_hash and response_hash (SHA-256) and writes those.
• Unit tests assert no raw prompt or response text escapes the parser.
• Customers concerned about content can disable request-metadata capture entirely and still receive model/cost/latency-level attribution and recommendations.
• Anonymized aggregates that feed our public benchmark report are gated behind explicit per-tenant consent.

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Customer onboarding — least-privilege IAM

• Consolidated billing with separate payer — payer-account CUR read + member-account Bedrock log read.
• SCP-restricted environments — RolePathPrefix parameter for Organizations that mandate a custom path.
• AWS Control Tower / Landing Zone — defaults to AWSControlTowerExecution jump role.
• Cross-account CUR — separate bucket-policy snippet shipped as a distinct artifact (security teams routinely review these independently).

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Secret rotation

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Tenant offboarding

1. Soft delete (30 days) — tenant moves to offboarding_pending. Ingestion stops, dashboards become read-only, recommendations freeze. Data is retained for 30 days to allow recovery.
2. Archive (7 days) — tenant moves to offboarding_archive. A signed export bundle (CSV + JSON) is delivered to the tenant’s offboarding contact.
3. Hard delete — every tenant-scoped row is purged via chunked DELETE per schema (large schemas like ai.ai_spend_events are deleted in batches to avoid bloat). Customer-owned S3 buckets are not touched — those are the customer’s to manage.
4. Audit-trail preservation — audit.* rows survive offboarding indefinitely; required for compliance and legal-hold preservation.

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Penetration testing

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Background checks and security training

• Background checks on every team member with production access.
• Annual security awareness training (KnowBe4) for all staff.
• Quarterly tabletop incident-response exercises.

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What an enterprise prospect typically asks for

• Security questionnaire (SIG / CAIQ) — completed on request, typically 48–72 hours.
• Architecture diagrams at three levels (exec, platform-lead, security-reviewer). Available on request.
• Subprocessor list and DPA. Available on request.
• SOC 2 bridge letter — issued during the Type I observation window (Q2-Q3 2026).
• Penetration-test executive summary — under NDA.
• Sample audit-trail export — under NDA.

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Reporting a vulnerability

• A description of the issue and potential impact.
• Reproduction steps (PoC, logs, screenshots).
• Affected versions / commit hashes.
• Suggested mitigations if any.